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Abstract: If deployments of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) are to be-
come common outside of purely experimental settings, protocols operating such
MANETs must be able to preserve network integrity, even when faced with
careless or malicious participants. A first step towards protecting a MANET
is to analyze the vulnerabilities of the routing protocol(s), managing the con-
nectivity. Understanding how these routing protocols can be exploited by those
with ill intent, countermeasures can be developed, readying MANETs for wider
deployment and use.
One routing protocol for MANETs, developed by the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) as a multicast routing protocol for efficient data dissemi-
nation, is denoted “Simplified Multicast Forwarding” (SMF). This protocol is
analyzed, and its vulnerabilities described, in this memorandum.
SMF consists of two independent components: (i) duplicate packet detection
and (ii) relay set selection, each of which presents its own set of vulnerabilities
that an attacker may exploit to compromise network integrity. This memoran-
dum explores vulnerabilities in each of these, with the aim of identifying attack
vectors and thus enabling development of countermeasures.
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Analyse de Vulne´rabilite´ du Protocole
“Simple Multicast Forwarding (SMF)”
pour des Re´seaux Ad Hoc
Re´sume´ : Afin d’augmenter le nombre de de´ploiements de re´seaux ad hoc
dehors des “testbeds” purement expe´rimentals, des protocoles de routage des
re´seaux ad hoc doivent eˆtre en mesure de pre´server l’inte´grite´ du re´seau, meˆme
lorsqu’ils sont confronte´s avec des participants imprudents ou malicieux. Un
premier pas vers la protection d’un re´seau ad hoc est d’analyser les vulne´rabilite´s
du protocole de routage qui ge`re la connectivite´ du re´seau. En comprenant
comment ces protocoles de routage peuvent eˆtre exploite´s par des personnes
ayant de mauvaises intentions, des contre-mesures peuvent eˆtre dveloppe´es.
Un protocole de routage pour des re´seaux ad hoc, de´veloppe´ par l’Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) comme protocole de routage de multicast pour
la diffusion efficace des donne´es, est appele´ “Simplified Multicast Forwarding”
(SMF). Ce protocole est analyse´, et ses vulne´rabilite´s de´crites dans ce rapport.
SMF est constitue´ de deux composantes inde´pendantes: (i) la de´tection des
paquets duplique´s et (ii) la se´lection des relais, dont chacun pre´sente son propre
ensemble de vulne´rabilite´s qu’un attaquant peut exploiter pour compromettre
l’inte´grite´ du re´seau. Ce rapport explore des vulne´rabilite´s dans chacune des
deux composantes, afin d’identifier les vecteurs d’attaque, ainsi de permettre de
de´velopper des contre-mesures.
Mots-cle´s : MANET, multicast, securite´, vulne´rabilite´, SMF, attaques, IETF
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1 Introduction
Network integrity in wired, multi-hop networks is largely preserved by physically
controlling access to the communications channel between routers: know thy
peers, know which behavior to expect from thy peers, trust thy peers – and be
able to disconnect thy peers if they show not worthy of that trust. In a MANET
(Mobile Ad hoc NETwork), often operated over wireless interfaces, such is less
obvious: physical access to the media between routers is not delimited by a cable,
but is available to anyone within transmission range; the network topology is
time-varying, either due to router mobility or due to time-varying characteristics
of the channel; traffic is often retransmitted over the same wireless interface
as the one over which it was received. Consequently, MANET protocols are
conceived to manage conditions where less – or no – a-priori structure is present
between peers, and are exposed to characteristics not commonly found in classic
wired networks.
This exposure also renders MANET protocol more vulnerable to attacks,
although two things shall be noted. First, MANET protocols by way of their
lack of a-priori infrastructure knowledge and lack of physical access control to
the communications channel are simply “exposing” and rendering more easily
exploitable vulnerabilities already present in classic networks (e.g., such as in-
jecting rouge traffic in a network). Second, MANET protocols having to manage
specific characteristics (e.g., retransmission of traffic on an interface over which
it was received), introduces new, specific protocol mechanisms, which may be
open to attacks.
1.1 Background and History
The “Simple Multicast Forwarding” (SMF) protocol [1] is a multicast routing
protocol for MANET-wide efficient broadcasting, employing reduced relay sets
for decreasing the number of redundant retransmissions of a data packet. Re-
duced relay sets so used were introduced in and standardized for IP networks by
way of the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR [2]) in 2003, where
such were used for substantially reducing the protocol overhead incurred by dif-
fusion of routing protocol control traffic (link state advertisements, in [2] denoted
“TC messages”). The reduced relay set mechanism in OLSR is based on Multi-
Point Relays (MPRs) [3]. This concept was retained and used in an extension
of OSPF for MANET areas [4]. The reactive MANET routing protocol AODV
[5] also uses MANET-wide broadcast of its control traffic (route requests). [6]
showed that using MPRs for flooding such control traffic resulted not just in
reduced channel load, but also in shorter unicast paths. Other experimental
routing protocols, including [7] and [8], have used different relay set selection
mechanisms, and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is standardizing
the MANET routing protocol OLSRv2 [9], retaining the MPR concept.
The success of such reduced relay sets for protocol control traffic diffusion
lead to investigations into using such also for user data traffic, including [10]
and [11], ultimately leading to the IETF proposing development of SMF [1] as
an experimental protocol.
RR n° 7638
4 T. Clausen, U. Herberg, J. Yi
1.2 SMF Overview
SMF provides basic IP multicast routing for MANETs. It consists of two main
components: multicast “Duplicate Packet Detection” (DPD) and “Relay Set
Selection” (RSS).
1.2.1 Multicast Duplicate Packet Detection (DPD)
DPD is used as part of the forwarding process to check if an incoming packet has
been previously received (and forwarded) – and therefore should be dropped –
or not. In MANETs, as illustrated in figure 1, duplicate packets are a common
fact of life: router n1 is retransmitting a broadcast packet received from router
n0 on the same interface as the one over which it was received, so as to ensure
receipt also by router n2 – causing router n0 to receive the packet a second time.
N2N1N0
Figure 1: The need for duplicate detection: retransmission over the same inter-
face as a packet was received.
DPD is achieved by a router maintaining a record of recently processed mul-
ticast packets, and comparing received multicast packets herewith. A duplicate
packet detected is silently dropped and not inserted into the forwarding path of
that router, nor delivered to an application. DPD, as proposed by SMF, sup-
ports both IPv4 and IPv6 and for each suggests two duplicate packet detection
mechanisms: 1) header content identification-based DPD (I-DPD), using packet
headers, in combination with flow state, to estimate temporal uniqueness of a
packet, and 2) hash-based DPD (H-DPD), employing hashing of selected header
fields and payload for the same effect.
1.2.2 Relay Set Seletion
RSS produces a reduced relay set for use when relaying information across the
MANET. SMF supports the use of several relay set algorithms, including E-
CDS (Essential Connected Dominating Set), S-MPR (Source-based Multi-Point
Relay), or MPR-CDS. Those algorithms are based on localized election, derived
from those explored for efficient topology diffusion in MANET routing protocols.
INRIA
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1.3 Statement of Purpose
While multicast protocols and efficient flooding mechanisms are well studied
for performance and convergence properties, little work considers also security
issues and implications of the protocols in use – which assume that the routers in
the networks can be “trusted” to perform properly. In any deployment scenario,
however, this assumption cannot be taken at face value: the “accessibility”
of a wireless communications channel may open access to malicious routers
attempting to participate in the network – or an otherwise non-malicious router
may simply be misconfigured.
If deployments of MANETs are to become common outside experimental
settings, protocols operating in such networks must be resilient to such malice
or misconfiguration. A first step towards such resilience is to understand the
vulnerabilities of a given protocol and identify probable attack vectors hereon.
This memorandum analyses SMF in order to understand its vulnerabilities.
Various threats, from accidental misbehavior of routers or from intentionally
malicious attackers, are studied, and threat sources, threat actions, threat con-
sequences, etc. are explored. While the study is generally based on SMF, the
components of SMF, such as duplicate packet detection and relay set selection,
are common in other multicast routing protocols, and may therefore be also
more generally applicable.
While the memorandum has the ambition of being thorough, in matters of
security it is prudent to be explicit to not claim completeness of an analysis.
1.4 Memorandum Outline
The remainder of the memorandum is organized as follows. In section 2, threats
to DPD are first discussed. Possible attacks to the Relay Set Selection Vector
(RSSV), which is used for identify different types of RSS algorithms, are pre-
sented in section 3. The general threats to RSS are presented in section 4. The
memorandum is concluded in section 5.
2 Threats to Duplicate Packet Detection
The DPD mechanism is based on a unique identity check of the incoming pack-
ets. A router needs to record a history of processed multicast packets so as to
ensure that a given packet is processed and forwarded at most once – which
entails that such history must be maintained for at least the maximum network
traversal time of a packet. However, neither IPv4 nor IPv6 contains mecha-
nisms for uniquely identifying a given packet. SMF introduces two mechanisms
compensating this: I-DPD and H-DPD. This section discusses attacks on each
of these, as well as the consequences on protocol operation that such may have.
2.1 Identification-based DPD (I-DPD)
For I-DPD, a DPD identifier in the packet header is used for identification of a
packet. In case of fragmented packets, and packets using IPsec, the contained
fragment and packet sequence numbers can be used. When neither is present,
an additional identifier in the packet header is needed. SMF proposes an IPv6
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header option to this effect, recognizing that adding such IP packet header
information is not supported for IPv4.
The identification of a packet is, then, based on the source IP address and
the sequence number (from IPsec, fragment number or header option). In this
way, when each intermediate router receives a packet, it can determine if the
packet has been received before.
2.1.1 Pre-play Attack
If a malicious router can obtain the (source IP, sequence number) of a packet,
it can inject (invalid) packets with exactly the same identification information
into the network. As such an invalid packets propagates through the network,
if arriving before the valid packet with same identification information, this
valid packets will be discarded as a duplicate. If further sequence numbers are
predictable, a malicious router can inject invalid packets with valid sequence
numbers in advance, ensuring that subsequent valid packets are discarded as
duplicates.
Figure 2 illustrates an example of a pre-play attack. Router a is the source
and generates a multicast packet with sequence number n. When the malicious
router X receives the packet, it injects an invalid packet with the same sequence
number n. Routers which receive the invalid packet first will discard subsequent
arrivals of the valid packet. The consequence hereof depends on the network
topology: as depicted in figure 2, the attack might not affect routers that are
farther away from the malicious router than they are from the source router
(i.e., routers e and h), as the valid packet might reach those routers first. For
routers closer to the attacker than to the source (i.e., router g and f ), the invalid
packet will be received first, causing subsequently arriving valid packets to be
dropped. For routers with equal distance (router c and d), it depends on the
link status and the transmission of the routers.
When the succession of sequence numbers from a source is predictable, a
malicious router can, upon having observed a valid packet being generated by
a legitimate router, conduct a pre-play attack by injecting invalid packets with
not-yet-used-but-soon-to-be-used sequence numbers. As shown in figure 3, if an
incremental algorithm is used for generating sequence numbers, X can thereby
prohibit corresponding valid packets from attaining the part of the network
reachable from X without passing through a. The following packets from a
with seq = n + 1, seq = n + 2, etc, will be regarded as duplicate packets and
discarded.
Another possible pre-play attack is based on the Time-to-Live (TTL) or
hop limit field1. As routers only forward packets with TTL > 1, a malicious
router can forward an otherwise valid packet, while drastically reducing the
TTL hereof. This will inhibit recipient routers from later forwarding the same
multicast packet, even if received with a different TTL – essentially a malicious
router thus can instruct its neighbors to block forwarding of valid multicast
packets. As the TTL of a packet is intended to be manipulated by intermedi-
aries forwarding it, classic methods such as signatures are typically calculated
with setting TTL fields to some pre-determined value (e.g., 0) – such is for ex-
ample the case for IPsec Authentication Headers‘[12] – rendering such an attack
1Henceforth, TTL is used indiscriminately for both TTL and hop-limit.
INRIA
Vulnerability Analysis of SMF 7
a
x
b
c
d
e
seq = n
seq = n
seq = n
f
g
h
Figure 2: Pre-play attack: X is a malicious router, which generates invalid
packets with valid sequence numbers.
a
x
b
seq=n
seq=n+1
seq=n
seq=n+2
...
Figure 3: Pre-play attack by predicting sequence number. X is a malicious
router, which generates invalid packets with predicted sequence number.
more difficult to both detect and counter. If the malicious router has access to
a “wormhole” through the network (a directional antenna, a tunnel to a collab-
orator or a wired connection, allowing it to bridge parts of a network otherwise
distant) it can make sure that the packets with such an artificially reduced TTL
arrive before their unmodified counterparts.
Figure 4 illustrates an example of this attack, with X being the malicious
router. On receiving a packet with TTL = 63 and seq = n, X broadcasts the
same packet, but with an artificially reduced TTL = 1. For routers near X,
such as c, d, and e, if they receive the packet with the artificially reduced
TTL before the valid packet arrives, the valid packet will be discarded. If a
wormhole between X and a distant router i exists, X can inject the packet
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with the artificially reduced TTL to i, and to the part of the network reachable
through i – which would subsequently discard later arriving valid packets.
a
x
b
c
d
e
TTL = 63,
seq = n
TTL = 62,
seq = n
TTL = 1,
seq = n
i
TTL = 1,
seq = n
Wormhole link
j
k
Figure 4: Pre-play attack based on TTL values. X is the malicious router which
forwards the packets with reduced TTL values.
2.1.2 Sequence Number Attack
In a pre-play attack, a malicious router makes use of the DPD mechanism to
force other routers to discard otherwise valid packets – thus preventing these
from reach parts of the network. A malicious router can also seek to disable
DPD, by modifying the sequence number in packets that it forwards. Thus,
routers will not be able to detect an actual duplicate packet as a duplicate –
rather, they will treat them as new packets, i.e., process and forward them.
The consequence of this attack is an increased channel load, the origin of which
appears to be a router other than the malicious router.
In figure 5, when the malicious router X receives the packet (seq = n) from
router a, it simply modifies the sequence number to n + i, and sends it back
to the network. Router c will not be able to detect the duplicate packet, which
should be discarded.
[1] proposes use of IPsec sequence numbers as packet identifiers. If IPsec is
used, authentication and integrity of the packets is usually assumed protected.
In a MANET environment, the usage of IPsec is still not well defined – problems
include key distribution mechanisms, suitable cryptographic algorithms and the
use of IPsec for multicast. Furthermore, to the best of the authors knowledge,
few deployments of MANETs employ IPsec. Therefore, this memorandum does
not consider the usage of the IPsec options as presented in [1].
2.2 Hash-based DPD (H-DPD)
In H-DPD, a hash of the non-mutable header fields, options fields and data
payload is used as identifier of a packet, replacing explicit sequence numbers.
Each packet is, thus, uniquely identified by the IP address of the source of
the packet, and this hash-value. When a source host generates a packet, or
when a gateway ingresses the packet into the MANET, it calculates the hash-
value hereof. In case the source host or gateway identifies that it recently has
INRIA
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




 

Figure 5: Sequence number attack. X is the malicious router and modifies the
sequence number to disturb duplicate packet detection
generated or injected a packet with the same hash-value, it inserts a “Hash-
Assist Value (HAV)” IPv6 header option into the packet, shown in figure 6,
generated such that calculating the hash also over this HAV will render the
resulting value unique.
 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                ...              |0|0|0| OptType | Opt. Data Len |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |1|    Hash Assist Value (HAV) ...
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6: The Hash Assist Value header option in H-DPD mode
Note that the hash value in SMF is applied only to provide a low probability
of collision, and is specifically not used for cryptographic or authentication pur-
poses. Also note that threats, similar to those discussed in section 2.1 continue
to apply for when using H-DPD. One advantage of H-DPD over I-DPD may be,
however, that as the hash-value is calculated also over the data payload of the
packets, predicting subsequent hash-values and conducting a pre-play attack is
somewhat harder.
Introducing a header option, however, also introduces a potential vulnerabil-
ity: the HAV header option is only used when the source or the ingressing router
detects that a previously generated packet has an identical hash value as this
packet. A malicious router which discovers the existence of a HAV header in a
packet can therefore conclude that a hash collision is possible if the HAV header
is absent. Thus, it needs to simply remove the HAV header before retransmit-
ting the packet, which may cause the packet to be dropped by recipients. Again,
in doing so the malicious router causes the packet to be dropped not by itself,
but by other routers in the network.
As shown in figure 7, a is the source router and X is the malicious router. At
the source a, it generates a packet p, and stores the corresponding hash h(p) = x
in its DPD cache. The following packet p′ generated, has the same hash as the
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previous packet, i.e. h(p′) = h(p) = x. The source router a is able to detect the
hash collision by comparing it with the records in its DPD cache. Therefore, a
adds an HAV header as shown in figure 6, to avoid a possible collision by having
a new hash value h(p′ + HAV ) = x′. When the malicious router X receives
packet p′, it can conclude that a collision might happen by removing the HAV
header. On receiving packet p at router b, a record with hash h(p) = x is saved
in the DPD cache. The consequence is that packet p′ cannot be distinguished
by router b after the HAV header being removed because it has the same hash
h(p′) = x.
a x b
p
h(p)=x
p'
h(p'+HAV)=x'
p
h(p)=x
p'
h(p')=x
Figure 7: Attack based on the HAV field: The malicious router X produces a
hash collision by removing the HAV field.
Similarly, a malicious router can disrupt DPD by adding an HAV header
option to a packet. This modified packet cannot produce the same hash value
as the original packet, so it cannot be detected as a duplicate packet. This is
similar to the attack in I-DPD, where a malicious router can change the sequence
number for the same effect.
In figure 8, router a forwards the packet p with h(p) = x to router b and x.
The malicious router X, instead of forwarding the original packet unmodified to
b, adds an HAV header option with hash h(p + HAV ) = x′ 6= x. The router b
is unable to detect the duplicate packet and processes and forwards it as a new
packet.
a
x
b
p
h(p)=x
p
h(p)=x
p
h(p+HAV)=x'
Figure 8: Attack by adding a HAV header option: The malicious router X
disables duplicate packet detection by adding a HAV header option.
Another possible attack for a malicious router is to transmit many packets
with identical payload and IP header within a short time interval (“beacons”).
This has several implications when H-DPD is used: (i) similar to a “jamming”
attack, the increased load on the channel may lead to increased number of
collisions of data and control traffic packets. (ii) An (adjacent) router receiving
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such a beacon has to calculate and add a HAV header option to the packet
header. This operation is time-consuming, and the packet has to be stored
while the header option is generated. If a large number of beacons is received
by a router, memory and CPU resources may thus be exhausted by this “Denial
of Service” attack. (iii) When a packet is retransmitted by the adjacent router,
an entry is stored in the hash cache for some amount of time. A large number of
beacons within a short time may lead to an overflow of that buffer. Depending
on what cache management is used, older – possibly “legitimate” – hash entries
may be dropped from the cache, leading to an effective deactivation of the hash-
based DPD mechanism.
3 Threat to Relay Set Selection Vector (RSSV)
Reduced Relay Set Selection (RSS) in SMF is achieved by distributed algorithms
that dynamically calculate a topological Connected Dominating Set (CDS).
Such algorithms are generally based on the presence of a neighbor discovery
protocol, such as the “Neighborhood Discovery Protocol” (NHDP) [13], provid-
ing 1-hop and 2-hop neighborhood information. The relay set is then computed
by using one from among a set of possible algorithms, such as E-CDS, S-MPR,
etc. These algorithms are not interoperable, hence routers in a MANET must
communicate to their neighborhood which algorithm(s) they respectively sup-
port. To this end, [1] defines a “Relay Set Selection Vector” (RSSV), by way
of message and address block TLVs [14] to be used with the NHDP HELLO
message exchange, allowing a router to declare which RSS algorithms it and its
immediate neighbors support2.
In SMF, two TLV types are defined for RSS algorithms:
• An SMF message TLV type, which is used to identify the existence of an
SMF instance operating in conjunction with NHDP.
• An SMF address block TLV type, which is used to share the RSS algorithm
configuration information among 2-hop neighbors.
In both TLVs, a value is assigned to represent each RSS algorithm.
3.1 RSSV Spoofing
Given the fact that there may be different RSS algorithms operating concur-
rently in the same network, a router will have to select relay sets according to
compatibility of the algorithms operating in its immediate and 2-hop neighbor-
hoods. A potential attack is, therefore, if a router – intentionally or otherwise
– share false RSSV information for itself or for its neighbors.
For example, in figure 9, router a is about to select its relays. The following
RSS algorithms are used in different routers:
• E-CDS: router b, d, e
• S-MPR: router c, f, g
2While several RSS are supported in the same network, it is not clearly specified in the
current revision of SMF [1] whether a router can concurrently support several different RSS
at the same time.
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• MPR-CDS: router h
All routers, faithfully, declare their RSSV. Based on the messages from
routers b, h and c, router a learns what algorithms are supported by both
its direct neighbors and its 2-hop neighbors. This allows router a to observe
that while router h provides topological coverage to all of the 2-hop routers (d,
e, f, g), router h runs an RSS algorithm different from all of d, e, f, g. There-
fore, if a selects h as relay, h may not be able to select relays among d, e, f, g
and thus packet forwarding beyond d, e, f, g would not happen. Router a also
learns that router b runs the same RSS algorithm as the 2-hop neighbors d, e,
reachable via b – and that router c runs the same RSS algorithm as the 2-hop
neighbors f, g, reachable via c. Router a can therefore select b and c as relays,
knowing that both of these will be able to not only provide coverage to all 2-hop
neighbors, but also be able to select proper relays among these 2-hop neighbors.
a
c
b
d
e
f
g
h
RSSV=E-CDS
RSSV=E-CDS
RSSV=S-MPR
RSSV=S-MPR
RSSV=E-CDS
RSSV=S-MPR
RSSV=MPR-CDS
Figure 9: Relay set selection considering RSSV: Router a makes the decision
based on the RSSV declared by TLVs.
A malicious router, spoofing the RSSV of its 2-hop neighbors, is shown
in figure 10: X declares itself with RSSV=MPR-CDS in message TLVs, and
further declares that d, e, f, g have RSSV=MPR-CDS. Thus, router a will
choose X as sole relay: from the information available to a, X provides optimal
topological coverage of the 2-hop neighborhood – and by running the same RSS
as (declared for) all 2-hop neighbors, should be able to also do proper relay set
selection with these. As a consequence, X will “take control” of the multicast
traffic in its neighborhood – in this case, be able to prohibit b and c from being
selected as relays and, thus, if X isnot actually forwarding traffic or performing
RSS, disrupt network connectivity.
Finally, X might simply declare that all other routers have (only) RSSV=CF,
classical flooding, thus degrading the network performance to that of a simple
flooding domain.
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a
c
b
d
e
f
g
RSSV=E-CDS
RSSV=E-CDS
RSSV=S-MPR
RSSV=S-MPR
RSSV=E-CDS
RSSV=S-MPR
RSSV=MPR-CDS
x
X declares that
d: RSSV=MPR-CDS
e: RSSV=MPR-CDS
f: RSSV=MPR-CDS
g: RSSV=MPR-CDS
Figure 10: Attack on the RSSV to disrupt the relay set selection: The malicious
router X spoofs the RSSV of d, e, f, g.
3.2 RSSV Indirect Jamming
In a neighbor discovery based mechanism, a malicious router can intentionally
and frequently alter the information declared – including the RSSV – so as to
cause generation of inordinate amounts of control traffic by legitimate routers.
Such indirect jamming is discussed in [15] for neighborhood discovery and link
state advertisement, and also applies for the RSSV, which a malicious router may
alter and signal frequently, causing its neighborhood to launch (possibly com-
putationally intensive) RSS recalculations and signal selected relay set (causing
increased channel occupation) as well as the change of its neighbor’s status.
As shown in figure 11, the malicious router X first declares itself as RSSV=E-
CDS at t0. Router a will signal the change of its neighbor in its HELLO message
at t1 upon receiving the message from X. In a relatively short time, X advertises
in a HELLO that RSSV=S-MPR, and a link to another router b at t1. When a
receives this message at t2, it will believe that X has changed its status, then
calculate its MPR set and broadcast a new HELLO message. The above action
can be repeated to consume the power of a and the bandwidth.
4 Threats to Relay Set Selection
[1] provides a framework for RSS, without requiring the use of any specific
RSS algorithm. This section will, therefore, not explore the vulnerabilities of
a specific RSS algorithm, but rather general threats to the framework of SMF
relay set selection.
4.1 Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping is a common and easy passive attack in a wireless environment.
Once a packet is transmitted, any suitable transceiver can potentially obtain
a copy, for immediate or later decoding. Neither the source nor intended des-
tination can detect this. As previously indicated, SMF uses a neighborhood
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RSSV= E-CDS
x
aa
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RSSV= S-MPR
x
aa
x
X is E-CDS X is S-MPR
MPRs: (X)
t0 t1 t2 t3
b
Figure 11: Indirect jamming in RSSV: The malicious router X changes the
declaration of its RSSV frequently to make router a generate more control traffic.
discovery protocol for providing each router with 1-hop and 2-hop topological
information. A malicious router can eavesdrop on the NHDP message exchange
and thus learn this local topology information, as well as some source and des-
tination addresses of data packets transmitted.
Eavesdropping will not have direct threat to the network nor to SMF, but
it can provide crucial network information such as identity of communicating
routers, link characteristic, router configuration, etc., enabling other attacks.
4.2 Message Timing Attack
As NHDP is used to make relay set selection decisions, vulnerabilities of this
protocol also affect SMF operation. NHDP control messages define two types
of timing information:
• Validity time, the time upon receipt during which the information con-
tained within the message should be considered valid.
• Interval time, the time after which the next control message from the same
router should be expected.
For validity time, since information contained in control messages is consid-
ered valid only for the duration indicated, an attacker can simply eavesdrop
on NHDP messages from its neighbors, then instantly replay a received such
message – but modified to have a low validity time, illustrated in figure 12.
Router b broadcasts a HELLO message with valiT ime = 6s. Router a receives
the messages and marks the link between itself and b is valid for 6 seconds. X
eavesdrops on the messages, obtains the identity of router b, then transmits the
HELLO message with valiTime=0.1s. Receipt of this message by a causes a
to replace previously received link information, and therefore consider the link
between itself and b as invalid after very short time (0.1 second). For SMF,
this means that b will not be selected as relay by a even it may provide good
connectivity to other parts of the network.
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1
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2
Figure 12: Validity timing attack: The malicious router X spoofs b and declares
a short validity time of the link.
A similar threat is possible using the interval time, where a malicious router
can behave as described above and also indicate a low interval time. The recip-
ient of this message will expect a subsequent control message within this very
short time – which will not arrive. As a consequence, the recipient decreases
the link quality, or may even discard this link. Further vulnerabilities to the
NHDP exist, described in [15].
4.3 Multicast Disruption
RSS algorithms are based on a router having topological information describing
its 1-hop and 2-hop neighborhood. Thus, a malicious routers can spoof the links
to or identities of other routers in the network, and thus disrupt connectivity
and prevent multicast traffic from reaching parts of the network.
Figure 13 gives an example hereof, by way of link spoofing. The malicious
router, X, eavesdrops on NHDP control traffic, and learns of the existence of e
and f as 2-hop neighbors by way of b and c, respectively. X itself participates in
NHDP, however declares (spoofs) in its control messages that it, too, has links
to all neighbors of b and c – i.e.,declares the dotted links in figure 13. When a
is to select relays, it will choose X as its relay – X which may, then, simply
not re-transmit any multicast traffic received and thereby disconnecting e and f
from a.
A similar attack is possible by way of identity spoofing, as indicated in figure
14. The malicious router, X, eavesdrop on NHDP control traffic and learns of
the existence of c as a 2-hop neighbor by way of b. X itself then commences
participating in NHDP, but presenting itself under the same identity as b – thus
a will see c as a direct neighbor and not select b as relay. As a consequence, c is
not able to receive multicast traffic, again being disconnected from the network.
4.4 Broadcast Storm
In MANETs, a broadcast storm caused by classical flooding is a serious problem
because radio signals of two or more adjacent routers transmitting at the same
time are likely to overlap. This can result in redundancy, contention and colli-
sions [16]. Avoiding broadcast storms is one of the reasons why RSS algorithms
are used – in SMF as well as in routing protocols such as [2].
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a
c
b e
f
x
Figure 13: Multicast disruption by link spoofing: X spoofs the link to e and f.
a
x
b c
X spoofs the identify of c
Figure 14: Multicast disruption by node spoofing. X spoofs the identify of
router c to wipe c from the multicast domain
In contrast to the attacks described in section 4.3, a malicious router may
attack an SMF network by attempting to degrade RSS so as to produce classic
flooding, illustrated in figure 15. Bold lines with arrows present the intended
multicast traffic if the RSS algorithm run properly: b, d, f, h are selected as
relays by a, and c, e, g, i just receive packets from a without forwarding.
A malicious router X may disrupt this by overhearing NHDP control traffic,
thus learning of the 1-hop neighborhood of a. X may, then, generate control
messages performing both identity spoofing and link-spoofing, pretending to be
one of the 1-hop neighbors of a (e.g., any or all of b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i) and declare
that links to non-existing routers e.g., z, x, y, v, w exist for these, causing a
to select more (or all) of its 1-hop neighbors as relays, degrading into classic
flooding.
X may overhear control messages from some of the 1-hop neighbors of a and
thus learn of their 2-hop neighborhoods – and spoof links that it thus knows are
non-existing. Such would be the case for f and g, for example. For b and i, X
may not know what their 2-hop neighbors are, however may “make an educated
guess” when selecting links to spoof.
While this reduces network performance by disabling RSS and producing
classical flooding, the effect of this attack is only local. Except if X has accom-
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Figure 15: The broadcast storm attack: The bold line with arrow represents
normal multicast traffic, and the dashed line the redundant traffic caused by
having all the 1-hop neighbors of a be selected as relays.
plices throughout the network, b, c, d, e, f, g, h and i likely will be able to
select proper relay sets.
5 Conclusion
This memorandum has analyzed vulnerabilities of the “Simple Multicast For-
warding” (SMF) Protocol for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. In addition to vulnera-
bilities inherited from its use of NHDP for acquiring local topology information
allowing reduced relay set selection, SMF introduces two Duplicate Packet De-
tection mechanisms, each introducing additional vulnerabilities: disrupting net-
work connectivity, as well as allowing a malicious router to incite other routers
to produce unnecessary packet re-transmissions – thereby consuming precious
channel resources.
SMF also provides a framework for enabling different relay set selection
algorithms, to be used within SMF. As such algorithms may not be interopera-
ble, this framework introduces a signaling mechanism (RSSV) whereby a router
shares the algorithms it support itself – as well as the algorithms supported by
its neighbors. Intended to allow a router to select its relays such that the RSS
algorithms of these are compatible with algorithms of its 2-hop neighbors, the
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RSSV also allows a malicious router to present conflicting or incorrect informa-
tion, skewing relay set selection and possibly disrupting network connectivity.
Using NHDP for acquiring local topology, SMF inherits vulnerabilities of
NHDP – and additionally also introduces vulnerabilities by way of eavesdrop-
ping, message timing attack, link spoofing, node spoofing, etc., allowing a mali-
cious router to provoke connectivity disruption or a broadcast storm by degrad-
ing even RSS behavior to classical flooding.
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